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I: 
ARGUMENT 
THE UNDERLYING MISCONDUCT OF MOTHER AND 
HUSBAND AND THE RESULTING BONDING BETWEEN 
FATHER AND THE CHILDREN PRECLUDES MOTHER 
FROM RELYING ON THE PARENTAGE ACT. 
Mother and Husband's strategy, as clearly set out in their responsive brief, is to recast 
the unrebutted facts set out in the Amended Petition and supporting affidavits in such a way 
as to force a fit with portions of this Court's prior rulings interpreting the provisions of Utah 
Code§ 78B-15-607(1), as illustrated by R.P. v. K.S. W, 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084. 
See Appellees' Brief at 34-35, 18-19, 22-28. Mother and Husband assert that Father is just 
another putative father who conceived two children with a women he knew was married and, 
based thereon, has no right to assert or have adjudicated any parental rights to the children 
~ under the provisions of the Utah Parentage Act, Utah Code§ 78B-15-607(1). Id. This tactic 
has the effect of muddling all of the substantive issues raised in this appeal and thereby 
diverting the Court's attention from the central issues in this case created by its unique facts. 
Accordingly, before addressing Mother and Husband's specific responses to the issues 
raised and identified by Father in his opening brief, it is important to clearly identify why 
Father contends that the cited provisions of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUP A) and 
this Court's prior interpretation of them should not control the adjudication of Father's 
~ appeal. 
Father contends that Mother and Husband engaged in misconduct that satisfies all the 
elements of fraud, misrepresentation, civil conspiracy and fraudulent non-disclosure. Further, 
Father contends that the misconduct of Mother and Husband was intended to surreptitiously 
1 
obtain the benefits of the presumed father provisions in Utah Code § 78B-15-607(1) to 
deprive Father of any right to adjudicate the parentage of his two children while at the same 
time maintaining only an illusory or sham marriage with each other. 
Mother and Husband, for a lengthy period of time, misrepresented to and concealed 
from Father their marital relationship. Mother and Husband then allowed and encouraged 
Father to establish a deep bond and enduring relationship with his two children conceived 
with Mother. Father submits that based upon the misconduct, Mother and Husband should 
be legally and equitably precluded from claiming the benefits of the UUPA which would, in 
essence, allow them to profit from their misconduct and tortious acts. 
Additionally, this Court has explicitly held that the establishment of significant ties 
and bonding between a child and the putative Father would be a basis upon which the Court 
would re-examine its ruling interpreting and applying Utah Code§ 78B-15-607(1). This 
Court in R.P. v. K.S. W, 2014 UT App. 38,320 P.3d 1084, stated: 
Although constitutional considerations might require further 
analysis in cases such as this-where the alleged father has an 
established relationship with the child-R.P. has not raised a 
constitutional challenge in the district court or on appeal. 
Accordingly, we leave for another day the issue of the 
constitutional implications of the UUPA' s standing limitations 
where the alleged father has an established relationship with the 
child. 
Id. ,I 7. This is such a case that requires further analysis of the constitutional considerations. 
2 
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A. The Facts Alleged in the Amended Petition and Supporting Affidavits 
Establish the Misconduct of Mother-Husband and Father's Reasonable 
Reliance Thereon in Establishing Substantial Bonds with the Children. 
Mother and Husband do not dispute that a motion to dismiss based upon the absence 
of subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by Rule 12(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Appellees' brief at 18-19). There is no disagreement that this Court, in 
adjudicating a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is to 
accept the factual allegations in the Amended Petition and supporting affidavits as true and 
further, to make all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Father. Id. See generally, 
~ Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. G,p. Ltd., 2014 UT 13, ii 46 n. 63, 325 P.3d 70, 82; 
Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertson, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,Iii 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226. Important to this 
case, any uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b )( 1 ). 
Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242,285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other grounds, 
Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27. 
Father, in his opening brief, specifically detailed the facts relating to Mother and 
Husband's misconduct and his resulting reliance thereon by developing and maintaining deep 
bonds with the minor children (Appellant's brief at 8-13). In response to six pages of 
specific facts, Mother and Husband essentially demurred stating that they denied the facts 
"based upon [Father's] lack of standing" (Appellees' brief at 5-7). Mother and Husband 
have offered no substantive denials to the specific facts claimed by Father. Id. 
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Based thereon, the relevant facts established in this case are as follows. Father began 
an intimate relationship with Mother only after she represented to Father that she was 
separated from Husband and was in the process of a obtaining a divorce that was to be 
finalized imminently. Appellant's brief at 8-9. Consistent with her representations to Father, 
Mother provided Father with a copy of the divorce decree dissolving the marriage with 
Husband, dated March 26, 2012. Id. at 9-10. During the relevant time period, Mother and 
Father were living together in an apartment in St. George, Utah with Mother's two children 
that were previously conceived with Husband. Id. Father saw and was told nothing that 
would indicate the existence of any ongoing romantic relationship between Mother and 
Husband or of Husband's continued involvement in the lives of his two children. Id. 
Critically, under the guise of facilitating the imminent birth of Mother and Father's 
first child (Mother's third child), G .L.H., Mother told Father she was going back to Utah 
County to be with her parents. Id. During this time, Father and Mother discussed the details 
of their anticipated marriage. With Father anticipating marriage to Mother and the birth of 
his first child by her, Mother and Husband took actions that can only be described as cruel, 
bizarre and tortious. Mother and Husband, without advising Father in any degree or manner, 
remarried on August 21, 2012, in Arizona. Id. Appellees' brief at 5-7. Father and Mother's 
first child was born on August 23, 2012, two days later. Id. Mother and Husband knew the 
child was Father's. R. 1, 120, 142, 309, 430, 432; Appellant's brief at 8-14. 
As if Mother and Husband's conduct could not get any more bizarre, Mother explicitly 
and repeatedly represented to Father from March 26, 2012, that she was unmarried and was 
4 
only in a relationship with Father. Father and Mother continued to live together with the three 
children as Husband and wife. Appellant's brief at 8-14. Father justifiably concluded that 
Mother was unmarried when each of his two children were born (G .L.H. was born 8/23/2012 
and H.H. was born 12/4/2013); and that Mother had no on-going relationship with Husband. 
R. 1, 120, 142, 309, 430, 432; Appellant's brief at 8-14. In addition, both Mother and 
Husband allowed Father to act as the children's Father and develop a close and intimate 
relationship with his children. Id. Husband did nothing to put Father on notice of his 
remarriage to Mother or of Husband's intent to act as a parent to Father's two children. 
Finally, the remarriage of Mother and Husband, divulged in this litigation, was 
illusory and a sham. Mother and Husband did not live together as Husband and wife after 
their remarriage and Husband did not undertake to parent Father and Mother's two children 
Id. Husband allowed Father to openly live with Husband's "wife" and act as father to his 
two children. Husband never asserted his rights either to Mother or the children in a way to 
give notice to Father of his intent. Id. 
Mother and Husband have yet to offer any explanation for their reprehensible 
misconduct. Father submits that there can only be one reasonable and rationale explanation. 
Mother and Husband, solely to gain the benefits of the presumed parent provisions of the 
UUPA, surreptitiously remarried a day before Father's first child with Mother was born. Id. 
The conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Mother and Husband's remarriage is illusory 
and a sham without any form or content. The unrebutted facts are that Mother and Husband 
did not maintain a husband and wife relationship after their alleged remarriage on August 21, 
5 
2012, two days before the birth of G.L.H. Id. Instead, Father and Mother have maintained 
the only recognizable "husband-wife" relationship during and after Mother's pregnancy with 
Father's two children. 
B. Mother and Husband Should be Legally and Equitably Precluded from 
Bene.fitting from Their Misconduct. 
Although never disclosed to Father prior to litigation, Mother and Husband have 
supplied the court with a copy of a marriage certificate establishing that after their divorce 
on March 26, 2012, they remarried on August 21, 2012 in Coconino County, Arizona. R. 
266, 276. The date of the remarriage would, on its face, satisfy the requirements of Utah 
Code§ 75B-l 5-204 that invoke a presumption of paternity in favor of Husband and eliminate 
Father's right to adjudicate paternity of his two biological children born to Mother. Utah 
Code§ 75B-15-607. Father maintains that the tortious misconduct of Mother and Husband 
and his reasonable reliance thereon in establishing deep bonds with the children negates their 
right to claim the benefits of the statute. Appellant's brief at 24-27, 28-32. 
In response, Mother and Husband do not substantively deny any of the alleged 
misconduct. Appellees' brief at 5-14. There is no affirmative representation of either Mother 
or Husband that they lived together as husband and wife after their remarriage, or that they 
implemented any of the traditional practices associated with marriage as between themselves 
or with the children. Appellees' brief at 5-7. Mother and Husband offer no explanation or 
apology for their unconscionable actions. Neither denies the existence of the 
misrepresentations and non-disclosure claimed by Father. Id. 
6 
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Father submits that applying the prohibition against a putative father seeking to 
adjudicate paternity when the mother is married at the time of birth, as set out in Utah Code 
§ 75B-15-607, would not further the intent and purpose of the Utah Parentage Act under the 
facts of this case. In R.P. v. K.S. W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084, the Court determined 
that the intent of the legislature was to incorporate the common law assumption that 
"parenthood within marriage best protects children." Id. ii 23 ( citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). The "unstated presumption about marriage is that the marital relationship 
could not survive the presence of the biological father." Id. These legislative goals are not 
furthered by applying the statute in this case. 
The undisputed facts in this case are that Husband never lived as husband and wife 
with Mother after their initial separation. Father, in reliance on Husband's inaction and 
silence, intensified his relationship with Mother and assumed all of the paternal duties 
attendant to rasing the children. 
Mother's conduct was worse. She lived openly with Father, proclaimed her legal 
availability and willingness to marry Father and encouraged his bonding with the children. 
Accordingly, because there was no actual marriage between Mother and Husband, because 
Husband did not actually resume a marital relation with Mother or take over parental 
responsibilities of the children, the policy of the statute would not be fulfilled by the 
enforcement of Section 607 in this case. 
Additionally, in Utah, there is a prohibition against person profiting by illegal and 
tortious misconduct. In the context of a constructive trust analysis the court in Rawlings v. 
7 
Rawlings, 2015 UT 85, 358 P.3d 1103, held that there should be "a disgorgement of any 
profits or benefits derived" by a "conscious wrongdoer" ( one who 'wrongfully disposes of 
property of another knowing that the disposition is wrongful ... ). Id. 1 31 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The equitable principle of disgorgement and a prohibition 
from tortious conduct being rewarded has been applied consistently by the courts. See 
generally, SEC v. Jones, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169666, *14 (D. Utah Dec. 18, 2015); 
Lawrence v. lntermountain, Inc., 2010 UT App 313,116,243 P.3d 508. 
Chesonis v. Brown, 2006 UT App 497, 153 P .3d 796, is specifically analogous to this 
case. This Court held the biological grandparents were no longer "grandparents" as defined 
by the grandparent visitation statute because their rights had been terminated by the adoption 
of the grandchild. This Court held, however, that they were entitled to proceed with tort and 
equitable claims including that the child's adoption and their loss of statutory grandparent 
rights was procured by fraudulent inducement, detrimental reliance, promissory estoppel and 
similar conduct set out in an amended petition. This Court held that where such allegations 
are made, it would be error to dismiss the petition without a hearing on the misconduct. Id. 
18. 
In this case, Mother and Husband's claimed ability to invoke the provisions of the 
Utah Parentage Act was the direct result of tortious misconduct. The facts establish that 
Mother engaged in blatant fraud and misrepresentation. Fraud exists where 
(I) ... a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he [ or she] had insufficient knowledge upon which 
8 
to base such representation; ( 5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; ( 6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his [ or her] 
injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). 
Mother repeatedly represented that she was divorced and legally able to marry Father 
after she had in fact remarried. Mother misrepresented every material fact relating to her 
remarriage to Husband including its existence. The misrepresentations were clearly made 
knowingly for the purpose of depriving Father of his right to adjudicate the parentage of his 
two children. Father, exercising due diligence, reasonably relied on the misrepresentations 
by conceiving the second child and developing and maintaining his deep and substantial 
relationship with both children. Both Mother and Husband engaged in tortious non-disclosure 
and civil conspiracy in furtherance of the same objective. 1 
1The elements of fraudulent nondisclosure or fraudulent concealment are (1) the 
existence of a legal duty to communicate information, (2) the failure to disclose, and (3) the 
establishment that the nondisclosed information was material. Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co., 
2011 UT 22, ~ 29, 254 P .3d 161; Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, ii 9, 31 P .3d 572. 
Mother and Husband, aside from not affirmatively disclosing the remarriage to Father, both 
took affinnative action to hide the facts relating to the remarriage from Father. 
Similarly, a claim for civil conspiracy is based upon the establishment of ( 1) a 
combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the 
minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) 
damages as a proximate result thereof." Fidelity Nat 'l Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT 
App 19, ~ 16, 344 P.3d 156 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As noted 
repeatedly herein, the only reasonable conclusion that can be made from the facts is that 
Mother and Husband conspired to deprive Father of any statutory or other right to adjudicate 
paternity of his two children. 
9 
Because Father's right to adjudicate the paternity of his two children under the Utah 
I 
Parentage Act was the target of the improper and tortious conduct of Mother and Husband, 
the Court should refuse to apply section 607 to this case. 
II: JUDGE McVEY'S RECOMMENDATION WAS SUBJECT TO 
REVIEW BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE ASSIGNED TO THE 
CASE. 
A. Judge Mc Vey 's Clear Intent was that His Disposition be Treated as a 
Recommendation Subject to Objection and Review by Judge Johnson. 
The parties agree on the material facts relating to Judge McVey's appearance at the 
hearing on the Mother's motion to dismiss. Appellant's brief at 18-20, Appellees' brief at 10. 
Judge Samuel Mc Vey, appearing on short notice because of Commissioner Patton's illness, 
expressly stated that he considered himself to be acting in the capacity of a domestic relations 
commissioner and so represented that to the parties and their counsel. R. 449-450 
(Addendum C to Opening Brief of Appellant). The parties relied on Judge McVey's 
representations as to his status as interim commissioner and proceeded to argue the motion 
to dismiss as if the proceeding was before a commissioner. The parties agree that Judge 
Mc Vey labeled his detennination a "recommendation" subject to the filing of an objection 
under Utah R. Civ. P. I 08 and a subsequent review by the judge assigned to the case, Judge 
Christine Johnson. Appellant's brief at 18-20, Appellees' brief at 10. 
Father contends that Judge McVey had the legal right to position himself, on an 
interim basis, as a domestic relations commissioner, thereby subjecting any recommendation 
he made in that capacity to the possibility that a party could object thereto pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. I 08, invoking a review by the judge assigned to the case. Appellant's brief at 17-
10 
21. Mother and Husband contend that a district court judge is legally precluded from acting 
as a commissioner and therefore Judge Mc Vey could not have acted as a commissioner in 
this case. Appellees' brief at 9-11. 
In response, Father contends that there are a myriad of statutes and legal principles 
that allow a judge to define or limit the effect of any ruling he may make. There is no 
question that Judge Mc Vey, because he had been called in on short notice and did not have 
a chance to thoroughly review the file and thus was unprepared and because the case was 
assigned to Judge Johnson, intended that his disposition and ruling be treated as an interim 
recommendation subject to objection and ultimately a review by Judge Johnson. Judge 
Mc Vey could not have been more explicit on his lack of preparation to hear the motion: 
I just want to review this RP case again. I picked this up late 
today and didn't have a thorough chance to look at it. I just 
skimmed it. 
R. 449-450 (Addendum C to Opening Brief of Appellant). 
It is really inconsequential that Judge Mc Vey may have improperly or incorrectly 
described the exact mechanism to be used for that process. Whether Judge Mc Vey was sitting 
as a commissioner or as a district court judge, he did not intend his adjudication to be final 
judgment or order. He expressly stated that his determination was to be subject to objection 
and review by Judge Johnson. Id. 
Mother wants to characterize Judge McVey's ruling as a final judgement or order, 
from which only an appeal or Rule 59 motion could be filed. However, Utah R. Civ. P. 54 
defines a "judgment" as "a decree or order that adjudicates all claims and the rights and 
1 1 
liabilities of all parties or any other order from which an appeal of right lies." Judge Mc Vey 
expressly stated that his recommendation was not to be a final order in the case and was to '--1 
be subject to objection and review by Judge Johnson. Therefore, his detennination could not 
have been a "judgement" as defined by rule 54. If Judge McVey's detennination was not a 
final judgment, the only other category of determination that could apply to his adjudication 
is that of an interim or temporary order-subject to review or alteration upon a full hearing 
or trial. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b). 
Additionally, Utah Code § 78A-2-201 (8) gives every court the authority to "amend 
and control its process and orders to conform to law and justice." Judge Mc Vey clearly Giiii 
invoked that power in expressly stating that he was not comfortable in entering a final order 
and intended the disposition to be treated like a commissioner's recommendation, subject to 
the objection process. Finally, Utah Code § 78A-2-225 expressly states that"[a] judge of a 
court of record may serve temporarily as a judge in another geographic division or in another 
court of record, in accordance with the Utah Constitution and the rules of the Judicial 
Council." Father submits that the statute clearly allows a district court judge to temporarily 
serve as a commissioner, who would then be subject to the procedure applicable to 
proceedings before a commissioner, Rule I 08. 
Based upon Judge McVey's clear intent, this Court should interpret his adjudication 
of the motion to dismiss as an interim order or recommendation subject to objection and 
review by Judge Johnson. 
12 
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B. Judge Johnson's Refusal to Review Judge Mc Vey 's Recommendation 
Created a Procedural Defect that Constituted a Denial of Due Process 
to Father. 
Mother and Husband dismiss Father's claims that he was denied due process by Judge 
Johnson's refusal to hear Father's objection filed in response to Judge McVey's 
recommendation that the case be dismissed. Mother and Husband simply assert that since 
Father was not entitled to object to an order of a district court judge, no due process rights 
were lost. Appellees' brief at 11-12. Mother and Husband do not address the effect of Judge 
McVey's explicit direction that his adjudication be treated as a recommendation subject to 
Judg Johnson's review by way of the filing of an objection. Id. 
Father's due process claims on this issue are two fold. Father submits that Judge 
Johnson violated the relevant rules and statutes in refusing to review and decide Father's 
objection to Judge McVey's recommendation under the terms of Rule 108. Utah R. Civ. P. 
108 allows a party a right to object to any recommendation of a commissioner. The rule 
allows the judge charged with the case to hold a hearing on any objection. It allows a party 
the right, upon request, 
to present testimony and other evidence on genuine issues of 
fact relevant to custody; and [] to a hearing at which the judge 
may require testimony or proffers of testimony on genuine 
issues of fact relevant to issues other than custody. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 108(d)(3). 
The rule then dictates that, 
[ t ]he judge will make independent findings of fact and 
conclusions of law based on the evidence, whether by proffer, 
testimony or exhibit, presented to the judge, or, if there was no 
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hearing before the judge, based on the evidence presented to the 
comm1ss1oner. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 108(f). 
Father claims that the expanded hearing process dictated by the rule in the objection-
review process coupled with the requirement that the reviewing judge make "independent 
findings of fact and conclusions of law" would have eliminated any doubt that the facts and 
related contentions alleged by the Father were true and accurate. Such a review would also 
have allowed for a complete discussion of the constitutionality issues discussed hereinafter. 
Importantly, the fact that Utah statutes and rules have determined that a review of a 
properly filed objection is a required part of the adjudication of a temporary order or 
recommendation, establishes that the deprivation of the hearing process is a due process 
violation. The Court in State v. Hegbloom, 2014 UT App 213, 362 P .3d 921, was faced with 
the issue of whether a collateral attack to a protective order rendered in a civil case can be 
made in a criminal case. In discussing the issue, the Court addressed the issue of whether the 
denial of a hearing voids a judgment and constitutes a due process violation: 
The basic facts of Wiscombe [ v. Wiscombe, 7 44 P .2d 1024, 1025 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)] are similar to those before us. In 
Wiscombe, a divorced couple attended a proffer hearing before 
a domestic-relations cmmnissioner. Id. at I 024-25. The husband 
made no written objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation, but claimed to have orally objected, a claim 
the wife challenged. Id. at I 025. The district court found that the 
husband had failed to properly object to the recommendation of 
the commissioner and entered judgment consistent with the 
commissioner's recommendation. Id. The husband directly 
appealed to this court. Id. 
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We held, "Given the lack of opportunity for a complete 
evidentiary hearing in proceedings before the domestic 
relations commissioner, we believe in this case that 
procedural due process requires that any doubts about 
compliance with Rule 8( d) ought to be resolved in favor of 
[the husband], who was seeking a full evidentiary hearing 
before [the district court]." Id. "One of the fundamental 
requisites of due process," we noted, "is the opportunity to 
be fully heard." Id. at 1025-26. And where "it was not clear 
that [the husband] waived his due process right to a full 
hearing," the district court should have granted one. Id. at 
1026. 
Id. ilil 18-19 ( emphasis added). 
As applied to the facts of this case, the denial of the process outlined after the filing 
of an objection to a recommendation is a denial of due process and acts to void the 
underlying judgment. 
Secondly, as stated above, Judge Mc Vey thought he was entering an interim or non-
final order and his thought process in resolving the case was so affected. Judge Mc Vey did 
not decide the motion thinking it was going to be a final order of a district court judge. He 
had stated on the record that he had just got the file and did not have a chance to thoroughly 
review the matter. R. 449 (Addendum C to Opening Brief of Appellant). He thought of it 
as an interim order subject to objection and Judge Johnson's review. The mental disposition 
of the judge denied Father the right to a determination made by a judge knowing that the 
vJJ same would be a final order and disposition and preparing accordingly. 
In sum, in Utah the Due Process Clause has been construed to encompass both a 
procedural and a substantive component. Under the procedural component, the courts have 
long recognized a general right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Children's Aid Soc. 
15 
of Utah, 681 P .2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) ( explaining that procedural due process requirements 
encompass the "notice and opportunity to be heard" that "must be observed in order to have ~ 
a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property"). 
In this case Father was specifically advised by Judge Mc Vey that he was sitting as a 
commissioner and was rendering a recommendation that was subject to objection and review. 
In direct contravention of that representation, Father was denied every opportunity and right 
attendant to the objection and review process set out in Rule 108. 
III: FATHER'S CONSTITUTIONALITY CLAIMS AS TO THE 
APPLICATION OF THE UUPA TO THIS CASE WERE 
PROPERLY PRESERVED. 
A. Father Adequately Pied the Facts and Related Legal Theories to 
Preserve his Contention that the UUP A is Unconstitutional as Applied 
to the Facts of this Case. 
Judge Mc Vey determined in his recommendation that Father failed to properly raise 
the issues relating to the constitutionality of the Utah Parentage Act and therefore the issues 
were waived. R. 513 (Addendum A to Opening Brief of Appellant). 
Father, in his opening brief, contended that he alleged all the factual predicates 
required to challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Parentage Act as applied to the facts 
of this case and that the legal arguments related thereto were clearly raised in the Amended 
Petition and in the memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Appellant's brief at 
28-33, R. 120, 142, 309, 430, 432. Father identified the specific portions of the Amended 
Petition, filed memoranda and other documents where the facts and legal theories were 
raised. Id. 
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Mother and Husband in response agree that "in the trial court, [Father] did generally 
~ invoke the issue of due process rights." Appellees' brief at 17. Mother's complaint is that 
Father did not specifically detail all arguments and failed to introduce any relevant legal 
authority or analysis. Id. 
The contentions of Mother and Husband are not consistent with the record. First, by 
acknowledging that Father did in fact "generally invoke the issue of due process," Mother 
and Husband have conceded the argument. The law requires only that to preserve an issue 
for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial court, in a such a way that 
-J a way that the trial court is afforded an opportunity to rule on an issue. DeBry v. Cascade 
Enters., 935 P .2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P .2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986), citing 
Meyer ex rel. Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984)). A trial court has the 
opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) "the issue must be raised 
in a timely fashion;" (2) "the issue must be specifically raised;" and (3) a party must 
introduce "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Hart v. Salt Lake County 
Comm 'n, 945 P .2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ( citations and internal quotations omitted). 
Father, in the Statement of Facts of his opening brief and in Point II thereof, 
exhaustively set out in detail the factual allegations that are contained in the pleadings that 
are relevant to a consideration of Father's standing and the constitutionality of the UUPA as 
applied to the facts of this case. Accordingly Father submits that the court's finding that the 
constitutionality issue had not been raised by Father is error. 
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The best evidence that the issue was adequately raised is the transcript of the actual 
hearing held in front of Judge Mc Vey. A copy of that transcript was made part of Father's 
Rule 59 motion, R. 449 (Addendum C to Opening Brief of Appellant). Judge McVey 
discussed in depth the constitutionality of the statute. Id. Even though Judge Mc Vey had 
questions as to whether the issue was properly raised, the issue was discussed by him and he 
ruled on the issue. Id. 
Father submits that he in fact preserved all of the issues related to his standing to bring 
this action and the constitutionality of the UUP A as applied to the facts of this case. 
Accordingly, the recommendation of Judge Mc Vey, and the order of Judge Johnson refusing 
to review that recommendation should be reversed and the matter remand for consideration 
of the factual and legal issues attendant to Father's standing and claims relating to the 
constitutionality of the UUPA as applied to the facts of this case. 
B. Father Should Have Been Given Adc:f itional Time to Conduct Discovery 
and Hone his Legal Theories Relating to Standing and the 
Unconstitutionality of the UUPA as it Relates to the Facts of this Case. 
If this Court finds that there are any insufficiencies in the facts or legal theories 
provided by Father to the court to support his constitutional and other claims, Father submits 
that the inadequacy is due to the failure of the trial court to allow any discovery or cross-
examination related to the summary affidavits filed by Mother and Husband. 
The record demonstrates that in response to Mother's motion to dismiss, Father 
explicitly asked for the court to strike the bald unsubstantiated factual allegations contained 
in the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss. R. 120, 130. Father further asked 
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for the right to conduct reasonable discovery related to the relevant factual issues and a 
continuance of any hearing on the motion to dismiss until discovery could be completed. R. 
120, 131. Father explicitly asked for the right to conduct discovery related to the purported 
divorce and remarriage of Mother and Husband. Specifically, Father requested the right to 
conduct discovery as to whether Mother and Husband cohabited after allegedly remarrying 
and if so, during what time periods. Additionally, evidence was relevant as to the relationship 
of Father and Husband with the children. Id. Counsel for Father filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit 
on October 7, 2014, requesting a reasonable time to conduct discovery before a hearing was 
held on the motion to dismiss. R. 240. 
Father submits he had a right, after the filing of the motion to dismiss, to gather 
evidence related to the factual and legal issues raised by the motion. Father then would have 
an opportunity to hone his legal arguments based upon the evidence produced. 
In the context of rule 56 motions, applications for discovery are to be granted liberally 
unless deemed to be dilatory or lacking in merit. Energy Mgmt. Servs., L.L. C. v. Shaw, 2005 
UT App 90, 110 P.3d 158; See also Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., Inc., 2002 
UT 39, ~ 24, 48 P.3d 910. The Court has held that in adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions, 
where matters outside the pleadings are considered, the trial court must allow an opportunity 
to respond to those additional matters. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, ~I 8, 155 P.3d 893, 
897. 
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Mother and Husband claims that rule 56(t) cannot be used in response to a rule 
12(b)(l) motion and that somehow, Father waived his right to conduct discovery in this case. (iii; 
Appellees' brief at 12-16. 
In response, Father contends that the court faced with a rule 12(b )( 1) motion should 
employ the same method outlined in rule 12(b )(6) in resolving factual disputes. This portion 
of rule 12(b) provides that if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56." 
There is no question that rule l 2(b )( 1 ), which is the basis of Mother and Husband's Q 
motion in this case, does not provide a similar provision for the conversion to summary 
judgment when outside material are relied upon by the court in its decision. However, this 
Court has consistently prohibited the weighing of evidence in adjudicating a motion to 
dismiss under Rule l 2(b )(1 ). To allow a court to enter findings on disputed material facts in 
the course of ruling on a motion to dismiss would deny to the parties "an adequate 
opportunity to rebut materials outside the pleadings." Spoons v. lewis, 1999 UT 82, ,i 4, 987 
P.2d 36. The offering of affirmative evidence does not automatically convert a rule 12(b)(l) 
motion in to one for summary judgment, but "uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing 
the court's subject matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss 
under rule 12(b)(l)." Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242,285 P.3d 1230; 
rev. on other grounds, Mall01y v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27,332 P.3d 922. 
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There is no question that the Utah appellate courts have placed a general prohibition 
against a court weighing evidence when considering motions to dismiss or for summary 
judgment. The law is clear that the trial court cannot weigh contradictory evidence or 
determine credibility when deciding whether dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate. 
See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73, iJ 18, 196 P.3d 588. Those 
principles are equally applicable in adjudicating a motion to dismiss. 
The docket reveals that Father had no opportunity to obtain any discovery, contrary 
to the claim of Mother and Husband. Appellees' brief at 16. Father learned, for the first 
time, that Mother claimed to have remarried Husband as of August 21, 2012 when Mother 
filed her motion to dismiss in this case on September 23, 2014, more than two years after 
the remarriage was claimed to have occurred. R. 111. Prior to that time, Father did not 
know of Mother's possible defense and claims under the UUPA. Father submits, that after 
overcoming the shock attendant thereto, he did everything reasonably necessary to gather the 
relevant facts and formulate the proper theories. On October 7, 2014, Father filed a motion 
to join Husband as an indispensable party (R. 244) and filed a motion for additional time to 
file an amended petition (R. 246). The court granted the motion and the Amended Petition 
was filed on was filed on December 5, 2014 (R. 309). 
Mother did not answer the Amended Petition until December 18, 2014 (R. 347). 
Husband did not answer the Amended Petition in the time allowed and a default certificate 
was filed on January 7, 2015 (R. 352). On January 9, 2015, Husband answered the amended 
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petition (R. 358). Judge Mc Vey conducted the hearing on the motion to dismiss on January 
22, 2015, thirteen days after the Husband filed his answer. (R. 372). 
Father submits that thirteen days is not sufficient under any construction of the rules 
to conduct discovery. Father simply was not afforded the time to accumulate and present 
additional facts and more refined theories to the court. Father submits that additional 
discovery on the issues related to the alleged remarriage of Mother and Husband is important. 
It would have allowed Father to document and substantiate his claim that the remarriage was 
a sham and hoax and that Mother had intentionally misrepresented her marital status and 
relation with Husband to Father, who justifiably relied thereon. Additional discovery would 
have established the deep bonding that occurred between Father and the children and the 
acquiescence of Mother and Husband thereto. The discovery would have allowed Father to 
hone his legal arguments relating to standing and the constitutionality of the relevant 
provisions of the UUP A. 
If the Court finds any defect in Father's efforts to preserve the arguments relating to 
his standing and the constitutionality of the UUPA as applied to the facts of this case, Father 
requests that this Court determine that Father's rule 56(-f) request to conduct discovery was 
not meritless or dilatory and therefore mandates the reversal of the court's order with 
instructions to allow the requested discovery before adjudicating the motion to dismiss. 
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IV: FATHER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING 
THAT HE HAS STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION 
AND THAT THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE UUP A ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
The facts of this case establish that Mother and Husband should not be allowed to 
claim the benefits of the UUP A because of the unlawful and tortious misconduct, the 
existence of a sham marriage, without any form or substance and the resultant bonding that 
has occurred between Father and the children. Appellants' s opening brief at 36-43. The facts 
create a prima facie showing that the relevant provisions of the UUP A are unconstitutional 
-.i) as applied to the facts of this case. Id. 
In response to Father's argument, Mother and Husband claim that Father is not 
entitled to "full fundamental rights and protections" because they were not perfected ( citing 
the procedure in adoption cases). Appellees' brief at 21-22. 
Father contends that Mother's response highlights the unique facts in this case. Father 
undertook due diligence and did everything that a reasonable person could or would do to 
ensure that Mother was not married when either of his two children were born. He saw, with 
:,ij his own eyes, the decree of divorce dated March 26, 2012. The children were born on 
August 23, 2012 and December 4, 2013. Mother continually represented her "single" status 
and willingness to marry Father and in addition, lived with him as Husband and wife. Under 
these facts, there was no way for Father to protect himself under the provisions of the UUPA. 
If a mother commits fraud and secretly marries or remarries, a father's integral rights to his 
offspring should not be forfeited. 
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Mother cites traditional cases where the putative father has been found to have no 
constitutional right to adjudicate paternity. See generally, Michael H v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110 (1989), Appellees' brief at 22-24. Father has recognized from the onset that section 607 
of the UUP A, on its face, limits the right of a putative Father to adjudicate paternity, when 
the Mother is married. Further, Father has understood and conceded that the facial 
constitutionality of the statute has been upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. Father's 
contention is that this case has factual elements that takes it out of those contemplated by the 
legislature and approved by the Utah Supreme Court. In this case, unlike any of the others, 
Mother and Husband have conspired together to misrepresent the marital status of Mother 
and thereby induce Father to pursue a relationship with Mother and conceive two children, 
during a time that Father believed Mother was single. Further, Mother and Husband 
conspired together to facilitate and encourage Father to bond with the children and develop 
a deep and on-going relationship. 
Because Father had no actual knowledge of Mother's remarriage and had no 
reasonable means to protect his rights against a secret and sham remarriage, Father's due 
process rights would be lost by strict application of the UUP A. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the court dismissing this case should be reversed. 
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